Legacy Metrics

Yesterday (or was it the day before? I’ve lost track of time with full time WFH now) the Times of India Bangalore edition had two headlines.

One was the Karnataka education minister BC Nagesh talking about deciding on school closures on a taluk (sub-district) wise basis. “We don’t want to take a decision for the whole state. However, in taluks where test positivity is more than 5%, we will shut schools”, he said.

That was on page one.

And then somewhere inside the newspaper, there was another article. The Indian Council for Medical Research has recommended that “only symptomatic patients should be tested for Covid-19”. However, for whatever reason, Karnataka had decided to not go by this recommendation, and instead decided to ramp up testing.

These two articles are correlated, though the paper didn’t say they were.

I should remind you of one tweet, that I elaborated about a few days back:

 

The reason why Karnataka has decided to ramp up testing despite advisory to the contrary is that changing policy at this point in time will mess with metrics. Yes, I stand by my tweet that test positivity ratio is a shit metric. However, with the government having accepted over the last two years that it is a good metric, it has become “conventional wisdom”. Everyone uses it because everyone else uses it. 

And so you have policies on school shutdowns and other restrictive measures being dictated by this metric – because everyone else uses the same metric, using this “cannot be wrong”. It’s like the old adage that “nobody got fired for hiring IBM”.

ICMR’s message to cut testing of asymptomatic individuals is a laudable one – given that an overwhelming number of people infected by the incumbent Omicron variant of covid-19 have no symptoms at all. The reason it has not been accepted is that it will mess with the well-accepted metric.

If you stop testing asymptomatic people, the total number of tests will drop sharply. The people who are ill will get themselves tested anyways, and so the numerator (number of positive reports) won’t drop. This means that the ratio will suddenly jump up.

And that needs new measures – while 5% is some sort of a “critical number” now (like it is with p-values), the “critical number” will be something else. Moreover, if only symptomatic people are to be tested, the number of tests a day will vary even more – and so the positivity ratio may not be as stable as it is now.

All kinds of currently carefully curated metrics will get messed up. And that is a big problem for everyone who uses these metrics. And so there will be pushback.

Over a period of time, I expect the government and its departments to come up alternate metrics (like how banks have now come up with an alternative to LIBOR), after which the policy to cut testing for asymptomatic people will get implemented. Until then, we should bow to the “legacy metric”.

And if you didn’t figure out already, legacy metrics are everywhere. You might be the cleverest data scientist going around and you might come up with what you think might be a totally stellar metric. However, irrespective of how stellar it is, that people have to change their way of thinking and their process to process it means that it won’t get much acceptance.

The strategy I’ve come to is to either change the metric slowly, in stages (change it little by little), or to publish the new metric along with the old one. Depending on how clever the new metric is, one of the metrics will die away.

Metrics

Over the weekend, I wrote this on twitter:

 

Surprisingly (at the time of writing this at least), I haven’t got that much abuse for this tweet, considering how “test positivity” has been held as the gold standard in terms of tracking the pandemic by governments and commentators.

The reason why I say this is a “shit metric” is simple – it doesn’t give that much information. Let’s think about it.

For a (ratio) metric to make sense, both the numerator and the denominator need to be clearly defined, and there needs to be clear information content in the ratio. In this particular case, both the numerator and the denominator are clear – latter is the number of people who got Covid tests taken, and the former is the number of these people who returned a positive test.

So far so good. Apart from being an objective measure, test positivity ratio is  also a “ratio”, and thus normalised (unlike absolute number of positive tests).

So why do I say it doesn’t give much information? Because of the information content.

The problem with test positivity ratio is the composition of the denominator (now we’re getting into complicated territory). Essentially, there are many reasons why people get tested for Covid-19. The most obvious reason to get tested is that you are ill. Then, you might get tested when a family member is ill. You might get tested because your employer mandates random tests. You might get tested because you have to travel somewhere and the airline requires it. And so on and so forth.

Now, for each of these reasons for getting tested, we can define a sort of “prior probability of testing positive” (based on historical averages, etc). And the positivity ratio needs to be seen in relation to this prior probability. For example, in “peaceful times” (eg. Bangalore between August and November 2021), a large proportion of the tests would be “random” – people travelling or employer-mandated. And this would necessarily mean a low test positivity.

The other extreme is when the disease is spreading rapidly – few people are travelling or going physically to work. Most of the people who get tested are getting tested because they are ill. And so the test positivity ratio will be rather high.

Basically – rather than the ratio telling you how bad the covid situation is in a region, it is influenced by how bad the covid situation is. You can think of it as some sort of a Schrödinger-ian measurement.

That wasn’t an offhand comment. Because government policy is an important input into test positivity ratio. For example, take “contact tracing”, where contacts of people who have tested positive are hunted down and also tested. The prior probability of a contact of a covid patient testing positive is far higher than the prior probability of a random person testing positive.

And so, as and when the government steps up contact tracing (as it does in the early days of each new wave), test positivity ratio goes up, as more “high prior probability” people get tested. Similarly, whether other states require a negative test to travel affects positivity ratio – the more the likelihood that you need a test to travel, the more likely that “low prior probability” people will take the test, and the lower the ratio will be. Or when governments decide to “randomly test” people (puling them off the streets of whatever), the ratio will come down.

In other words – the ratio can be easily gamed by governments, apart from just being influenced by government policy.

So what do we do now? How do we know whether the Covid-19 situation is serious enough to merit clamping down on people’s liberties? If test positivity ratio is a “shit metric” what can be a better one?

In this particular case (writing this on 3rd Jan 2022), absolute number of positive cases is as bad a metric as test positivity – over the last 3 months, the number of tests conducted in Bangalore has been rather steady. Moreover, the theory so far has been that Omicron is far less deadly than earlier versions of Covid-19, and the vaccination rate is rather high in Bangalore.

While defining metrics, sometimes it is useful to go back to first principles, and think about why we need the metric in the first place and what we are trying to optimise. In this particular case, we are trying to see when it makes sense to cut down economic activity to prevent the spread of the disease.

And why do we need lockdowns? To prevent hospitals from getting overwhelmed. You might remember the chaos of April-May 2021, when it was near impossible to get a hospital bed in Bangalore (even crematoriums had long queues). This is a situation we need to avoid – and the only one that merits lockdowns.

One simple measure we can use is to see how many hospital beds are actually full with covid patients, and if that might become a problem soon. Basically – if you can measure something “close to the problem”, measure it and use that as the metric. Rather than using proxies such as test positivity.

Because test positivity depends on too many factors, including government action. Because we are dealing with a new variant here, which is supposedly less severe. Because most of us have been vaccinated now, our response to getting the disease will be different. The change in situation means the old metrics don’t work.

It’s interesting that the Mumbai municipal corporation has started including bed availability in its daily reports.

Modelling for accuracy

Recently I’ve been remembering the first assignment of my “quantitative methods 2” course at IIMB back in 2004. In the first part of that course, we were learning regression. And so this assignment involved a regression problem. Not too hard at first sight – maybe 3 explanatory variables.

We had been randomly divided into teams of four. I remember working on it in the Computer Centre, in close proximity to some other teams. I remember trying to “do gymnastics” – combining variables, transforming them, all in the hope of trying to get the “best possible R square”. From what I remember, most of the groups went “R square hunting” that day. The assignment had been cleverly chosen such that for an academic exercise, the R Square wasn’t very high.

As an aside – one thing a lot of people take a long time to come to terms with is that in “real life” (industry problems) R squares aren’t usually that high. Forecast accuracy isn’t that high. And that the elegant methods they had learnt back in school / academia may not be as elegant any more in industry. I think I’ve written about this, but I can’t find the link now.

Anyway, back to QM2. I remember the professor telling us that three groups would be chosen at random on the day of the assignment submission, and from each of these three groups one person would be chosen at random who would have to present the group’s solution to the class. I remember that the other three people in my group all decided to bunk class that day! In any case, our group wasn’t called to present.

The whole point of this massive build up is – our approach (and the approach of most other groups) had been all wrong. We had just gone in a mad hunt for R square, not bothering to figure out whether the wild transformations and combinations that we were making made any business sense. Moreover, in our mad hunt for R square, we had all forgotten to consider whether a particular variable was significant, and if the regression itself was significant.

What we learnt was that while R square matters, it is not everything. The “model needs to be good”. The variables need to make sense. In statistics you can’t just go about optimising for one metric – there are several others. And this lesson has stuck with me. And guides how I approach all kinds of data modelling work. And I realise that is in conflict with the way data science is widely practiced nowadays.

The way data science is largely practiced in the wild nowadays is precisely a mad hunt for R Square (or area under ROC curve, if you’re doing a classification problem). Whether the variables used make sense doesn’t matter. Whether the transformations are sound doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter at all whether the model is “good”, or appropriate – the only measure of goodness of the model seems to be the R square!

In a way, contests such as Kaggle have exacerbated this trend. In contests, typically, there is a precise metric (such as R Square) that you are supposed to maximise. With contests being evaluated algorithmically, it is difficult to evaluate on multiple parameters – especially not whether “the model is good”. And since nowadays a lot of data scientists hone their skills by participating in contests such as on Kaggle, they are tuned to simply go R square hunting.

Also, the big difference between Kaggle and real life is that in Kaggle, the model that you build doesn’t matter. It’s just a combination. You get the best R square. You win. You take the prize. You go home.

You don’t need to worry about how the data for the model was collected. The model doesn’t have to be implemented. No business decisions need to be made based on the model. Contest done, model done.

Obviously that is not how things work in real life. Building the model is only one in a long series of steps in solving the business problem. And when you focus too much on just one thing – the model’s accuracy in the data that you have been given, a lot can be lost in the rest of the chain (including application of the model in future situations).

And in this way, by focussing on just a small portion of the entire data science process (model building), I think Kaggle (and other similar competition platforms) has actually done a massive disservice to data science itself.

Tailpiece

This is completely unrelated to the rest of the post, but too small to merit a post of its own.

Suppose you ask a software engineer to sort a few datasets. He goes about applying bubble sort, heap sort, quick sort, insertion sort and a whole host of other techniques. And then picks the one that sorted the given datasets fastest.

That’s precisely how it seems “data science” is practiced nowadays

Junior Data Scientists

Since this is a work related post, I need to emphasise that all opinions in this are my own, and don’t reflect that of any organisation / organisations I might be affiliated with

The last-released episode of my Data Chatter podcast is with Abdul Majed Raja, a data scientist at Atlassian. We mostly spoke about R and Python, the two programming languages / packages most used for data science, and spoke about their relative merits and demerits.

While we mostly spoke about R and Python, Abdul’s most insightful comment, in my opinion, had to do with neither. While talking about online tutorials and training, he spoke about how most tutorials related to data science are aimed at the entry level, for people wanting to become data scientists, and that there was very little readymade material to help people become better data scientists.

And from my vantage point, as someone who has been heavily trying to recruit data scientists through the course of this year, this is spot on. A lot of profiles I get (most candidates who apply to my team get put through an open ended assignment) seem uncorrelated with the stated years of experience on their CVs. Essentially, a lot of them just appear “very junior”.

This “juniority”, in most cases, comes through in the way that people have done their assignments. A telltale sign, for example, is an excessive focus on necessary but nowhere sufficient things such as data cleaning, variable transformation, etc. Another telltale sign is the simple application of methods without bothering to explain why the method was chosen in the first place.

Apart from the lack of tutorials around, one reason why the quality of data science profiles continues to remain “junior” could be the organisation of teams themselves. To become better at your job, you need interact with people who are better than you at your job. Unfortunately, the rapid rise in demand for data scientists in the last decade has meant that this peer learning is not always there.

Yes – if you are a bunch of data scientists working together, you can pull each other up. However, if many of you have come in through the same process, it is that much more difficult – there is no benchmark for you.

The other thing is the structure of the teams (I’m saying this with very little data, so call me out if I’m bullshitting) – unlike software engineers, data scientists seldom work in large teams. Sometimes they are scattered across the organisation, largely working with tech or business teams. In any case, companies don’t need that many data scientists. So the number is low to start off with as well.

Another reason is the structure of the market – for the last decade the demand for data scientists has far exceeded the available supply. So that has meant that there is no real reason to upskill – you’ll get a job anyway.

Abdul’s solution, in the absence of tutorials, is for data scientists to look at other people’s code. The R community, for example, has a weekly Tidy Tuesday data challenge, and a lot of people who take that challenge put up their code online. I’m pretty certain similar resources exist for Python (on Kaggle, if not anywhere else).

So for someone who wants to see how other data scientists work and learn from them, there is plenty of resources around.

PS: I want to record a podcast episode on the “pile stirring” epidemic in machine learning (where people simply throw methods at a dataset without really understanding why that should work, or understanding the basic math of different methods). So far I’ve been unable to find a suitable guest. Recommendations welcome.

The Science in Data Science

The science in “data science” basically represents the “scientific method”.

It’s a decade since the phrase “data scientist” got coined, though if you go on LinkedIn, you will find people who claim to have more than two years of experience in the subject.

The origins of the phrase itself are unclear, though some sources claim that it came out of this HBR article in 2012 written by Thomas Davenport and DJ Patil (though, in 2009, Hal Varian, formerly Google’s Chief Economist had said that the “sexiest job of the 21st century” will be that of a statistician).

Some of you might recall that in 2018, I had said that “I’m not a data scientist any more“. That was mostly down to my experience working with companies in London, where I found that data science was used as a euphemism for “machine learning” – something I was incredibly uncomfortable with.

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems like I was wrong. My view on data science being a euphemism for machine learning came from interacting with small samples of people (though it could be an English quirk). As I’ve dug around over the years, it seems like the “science” in data science comes not from the maths in machine learning, but elsewhere.

One phenomenon that had always intrigued me was the number of people with PhDs, especially NOT in maths, computer science of statistics, who have made a career in data science. Initially I dismissed it down to “the gap between PhD and tenure track faculty positions in science”. However, the numbers kept growing.

The more perceptive of you might know that I run a podcast now. It is called “Data Chatter“, and is ten episodes old now. The basic aim of the podcast is for me to have some interesting conversations – and then release them for public benefit. Yeah, yeah.

So, there was this thing that intrigued me, and I have a podcast. I did what you would have expected me to do – get on a guest who went from a science background to data science. I got Dhanya, my classmate from school, to talk about how her background with a PhD in neuroscience has helped her become a better data scientist.

It is a fascinating conversation, and served its primary purpose of making me understand what the “science” in data science really is. I had gone into the conversation expecting to talk about some machine learning, and how that gets used in academia or whatever. Instead, we spoke for an hour about designing experiments, collecting data and testing hypotheses.

The science in “data science” basically represents the “scientific method“. What Dhanya told me (you should listen to the conversation) is that a PhD prepares you for thinking in the scientific method, and drills into you years of practice in it. And this is especially true of “experimental” PhDs.

And then, last night, while preparing the notes for the podcast release, I stumbled upon the original HBR article by Thomas Davenport and DJ Patil talking about “data science”. And I found that they talk about the scientific method as well. And I found that I had talked about it in my newsletter as well – only to forget it later. This is what I had written:

Reading Patil and Davenport’s article carefully suggests, however, that companies might be making a deliberate attempt at recruiting pure science PhDs for data scientist roles.

The following excerpts from the article (which possibly shaped the way many organisations think about data science) can help us understand why PhDs are sought after as data scientists.

  • Data scientists’ most basic, universal skill is the ability to write code. This may be less true in five years’ time (Ed: the article was published in late 2012, so we’re almost “five years later” now)
  • Perhaps it’s becoming clear why the word “scientist” fits this emerging role. Experimental physicists, for example, also have to design equipment, gather data, conduct multiple experiments, and communicate their results.
  • Some of the best and brightest data scientists are PhDs in esoteric fields like ecology and systems biology.
  • It’s important to keep that image of the scientist in mind—because the word “data” might easily send a search for talent down the wrong path

Patil and Davenport make it very clear that traditional “data analysts” may not make for great data scientists.

We learn, and we forget, and we re-learn. But learning is precisely what the scientific method, which underpins the “science” in data science, is all about. And it is definitely NOT about machine learning.

Ranga and Big Data

There are some meeting stories that are worth retelling and retelling. Sometimes you think it should be included in some movie (or at least a TV show). And you never tire of telling the stories.

The way I met Ranga can qualify as one such story. At the outset, there was nothing special about it – both of us had joined IIT Madras at the same time, to do a B.Tech. in Computer Science. But the first conversation itself was epic, and something worth telling again and again.

During our orientation, one of the planned events was “a visit to the facilities”, where a professor would take us around to see the library, the workshops, a few prominent labs and other things.

I remember that the gathering point for Computer Science students was right behind the Central Lecture Theatre. This was the second day of orientation and I’d already met a few classmates by then. And that’s where I found Ranga.

The conversation went somewhat like this:

“Hi I’m Karthik. I’m from Bangalore”.
“Hi I’m Ranga. I’m from Madras. What are your hobbies?”
“I play the violin, I play chess…. ”
“Oh, you play chess? Me too. Why don’t we play a blindfold game right now?”
“Er. What? What do you want to do? Now?”
“Yeah. Let’s start. e4”.
(I finally managed to gather my senses) “c5”

And so we played for the next two hours. I clearly remember playing a Sicilian Dragon. It was a hard fought game until we ended up in an endgame with opposite coloured bishops. Coincidentally, by that time the tour of the facilities had ended. And we called it a draw.

We kept playing through our B.Techs., mostly blindfold in the backbenches of classrooms. Most of the time I would get soundly thrashed. One time I remember going from our class, with the half-played game in our heads, setting it up on a board in Ranga’s room, and continued to play.

In any case, chess apart, we’ve also had a lot of nice conversations over the last 21 years. Ranga runs a big data and AI company called TheDataTeam, so I thought it would be good to record one of our conversations and share it with the world.

And so I present to you the second episode of my new “Data Chatter” podcast. Ranga and I talk about all things “big data”, data architectures, warehousing, data engineering and all that.

As usual, the podcast is available on all podcasting platforms (though, curiously, each episode takes much longer to appear on Google Podcasts after it has released. So this second episode is already there on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, CastBox, etc. but not on Google yet).

Give it a listen. Share it with whoever you think might like it. Subscribe to my podcast. And let me know what you think of it.

Podcast: All Reals

I had spoken here a few times about starting a new “data podcast, right? The first episode is out today, and in this I speak to S Anand, cofounder and CEO of Gramener, about the interface of business with data science.

It’s a long freewheeling conversation, where we talk about data science in general, about Excel, about data visualisations, pie charts, Tufte and all that.

Do listen – it should be available on all podcast platforms, and let me know what you think. Oh, and don’t forget to subscribe to the podcast. New episodes will be out every Tuesday morning.

And if you think you want to be on the podcast, or know someone who wants to be a guest on the podcast, you can reach out. datachatterpodcast AT gmail.

Covid-19 recoveries in Bangalore

Something seems off in terms of the Covid-19 statistics for Bangalore. The number of “active cases” just don’t seem to be going down in line with the drop in the number of new cases. It seems like we’re not counting “recoveries” like we used to.

Active covid-19 cases in Bangalore in the second wave

In terms of active cases, covid-19 cases in Bangalore peaked in the middle of May. And then active cases started dropping rapidly. It seemed (when I ran this analysis towards the end of June) that active cases would drop well below 50,000 in the middle of June. However, as the graph shows, that hasn’t happened. The reduction in active cases has come down to a trickle.

Now it might well be that the way down is more gradual than the way up, but the thing is that the drop in active cases doesn’t square at all with the number of daily cases.

One metric we can look at is – how many days back do we have to go (in terms of newly infected cases) to get the current number of active cases? This is not correct – it assumes that infection is “first in first out” – but a good enough assumption for our analysis.

I’m writing this on 20th of June. As of today, there are 71000 odd active cases in Bangalore. And we have to go back 26 days to total up 71000 NEW INFECTIONS (assuming none of these people have died). This means that the average recovery period is far more than 26 days.

It wasn’t like this. I graphed this (I’m apologising for using a weird metric here. I thought of dividing active cases by new cases but thought that’s less accurate than this).

At the beginning of June, the number of active cases was equal to the number of new cases in the preceding 18 days. And notice that through June that number has gone up steadily. For whatever reason, the number of days after which a patient is considered “recovered” has been going up. It seems like we’re not counting the recoveries like we used to earlier.

I don’t know why we are doing this.

For the record, if the number of active cases has continued to be in the range of the number of new cases in the preceding 18 days, then we would have about 35,000 active cases in Bangalore right now. That is half the official number of active cases right now.

Again – I’m indulging in curve-fitting of some kind. Just that the data doesn’t tally.

PS: All data in this post from the brilliant covid19india.org .

Launching: Data Chatter

A few weeks back I had mentioned here that I’m starting a podcast. And it is now ready for release. Listen to the trailer here:

It is a series of conversations about all things data. First episode will be out on Tuesday, and then weekly after that. I’ve already built up an inventory of seven episodes. So far I’ve recorded episodes about big data, business intelligence, visualisations, a lot of “domain-specific” analytics, and the history of analytics in India. And many more are to come.

Subscribe to the podcast to be able to listen to it whenever it comes out. It is available on all podcasting platforms. For some reason, Apple is not listed on the anchor site, but if you search for “Data Chatter” on Apple Podcasts, you should find it (I did).

And of course, feedback is welcome (you can just comment on this post). And please share this podcast with whoever else you think might like it.

Should this have been my SOP?

I was chatting with a friend yesterday about analytics and “data science” and machine learning and data engineering and all that, and he commented that in his opinion a lot of the work mostly involves gathering and cleaning the data, and that any “analytics” is mostly around averaging and the sort.

This reminded me of an old newsletter I’d written way back in January 2018, soon after I’d read Raphael Honigstein‘s Das Reboot. A short discussion ensued. I sent him the link to that newsletter. And having read the bit about Das Reboot (I was talking about how SAP had helped the German national team win the 2014 FIFA World Cup) and the subsequent section of the newsletter, my friend remarked that I could have used that newsletter edition as a “statement of purpose for my job hunt”.

Now that my job hunt is done, and I’m no more in the job market, I don’t need an SOP. However, for the purpose that I don’t forget this, and keep in mind the next time I’m applying for a job, I’m reproducing a part of that newsletter here. Even if you subscribed to that newsletter, I recommend that you read it again. It’s been a long time, and this is still relevant.

Das Reboot

This is not normally the kind of book you’d see being recommended in a Data Science newsletter, but I found enough in Raphael Honigstein’s book on the German football renaissance in the last 10 years for it to merit a mention here.

So the story goes that prior to the 2014 edition of the Indian Premier League (cricket), Kolkata Knight Riders had announced a partnership with tech giant SAP, and claimed that they would use “big data insights” from SAP’s HANA system to power their analytics. Back then, I’d scoffed, since I wasn’t sure if the amount of data that’s generated in all cricket matches till then wasn’t big enough to merit “big data analytics”.

As it happens, the Knight Riders duly won that edition of the IPL. Perhaps coincidentally, SAP entered into a partnership with another champion team that year – the German national men’s football team, and Honigstein dedicates a chapter of his book to this, and other, partnerships, and the role of analytics in helping the team’s victory in that year’s World Cup.

If you look past all the marketing spiel (“HANA”, “big data”, etc.) what SAP did was to group data, generate insights and present it to the players in an easily consumable format. So in the football case, they developed an app for players where they could see videos of specific opponents doing things. It made it easy for players to review certain kinds of their own mistakes. And so on. Nothing particularly fancy; simply simple data put together in a nice easy-to-consume format.

A couple of money quotes from the book. One on what makes for good analytics systems:

‘It’s not particularly clever,’ says McCormick, ‘but its ease of use made it an effective tool. We didn’t want to bombard coaches or players with numbers. We wanted them to be able to see, literally, whether the data supported their gut feelings and intuition. It was designed to add value for a coach or athlete who isn’t that interested in analytics otherwise. Big data needed to be turned into KPIs that made sense to non-analysts.’

And this one on how good analytics can sometimes invert hierarchies, and empower the people on the front to make their own good decisions rather than always depend on direction from the top:

In its user-friendliness, the technology reversed the traditional top-down flow of tactical information in a football team. Players would pass on their findings to Flick and Löw. Lahm and Mertesacker were also allowed to have some input into Siegenthaler’s and Clemens’ official pre-match briefing, bringing the players’ perspective – and a sense of what was truly relevant on the pitch – to the table.

A lot of business analytics is just about this – presenting the existing data in an easily consumable format. There might be some statistics or machine learning involved somewhere, but ultimately it’s about empowering the analysts and managers with the right kind of data and tools. And what SAP’s experience tells us is that it may not be that bad a thing to tack on some nice marketing on top!

Hiring data scientists

I normally don’t click through on articles in my LinkedIn feed, but this article about the churn in senior data scientists caught my eye enough for me to click through and read the whole thing. I must admit to some degree of confirmation bias – the article reflected my thoughts a fair bit.

Given this confirmation bias, I’ll spare you my commentary and simply put in a few quotes:

Many large companies have fallen into the trap that you need a PhD to do data science, you don’t.

Not to mention, I have yet to see a data science program I would personally endorse. It’s run by people who have never done the job of data science outside of a lab. That’s not what you want for your company.

Doing data science and managing data science are not the same. Just like being an engineer and a product manager are not the same. There is a lot of overlap but overlap does not equal sameness.

Most data scientists are just not ready to lead the teams. This is why the failure rate of data science teams is over 90% right now. Often companies put a strong technical person in charge when they really need a strong business person in charge. I call it a data strategist.

I have worked with companies that demand agile and scrum for data science and then see half their team walk in less than a year. You can’t tell a team they will solve a problem in two sprints. If they don’t’ have the data or tools it won’t happen.

I’ll end this blog post with what my friend had to say (yesterday) about what I’d written about how SAP helped the German National team. “This is what everyone needs to do first. (All that digital transformation everyone is working on should be this kind of work)”.

I agree with him on this.