Grofers scaling down

Readers of this blog might be aware that I’m not a big fan of hyperlocal grocery delivery firm Grofers’s business model. The problem is that there are no costs saved to make Grofers its margin – apart from the retail inventory expense incurred at the retailer (from whom Grofers procures), there is also the last mile delivery expense that is incurred which doesn’t leave much profits.

The reason for Grofers scaling back from nine cities in India, however, is not related to this. It is more to do with market size and scale.

Given the uncertainties in terms of demand and service times, a business such as Grofers makes sense only when there is a minimum critical mass in terms of demand. Serving a locality with only one delivery person doesn’t make sense, for example, since uncertainty in demand will mean that either that delivery person is underworked or service levels cannot be guaranteed.

If the average demand in an area can support more delivery persons, though, this can smoothen out the uncertainty (that aggregation smoothens uncertainty is one of the fundamental principles of operations) and higher service levels can be guaranteed without building in too much slack.

While the cities that Grofers has pulled back from are not small (Mysore/Vizag/Coimbatore etc) it is unlikely that any of them would have had the size and density of demand in order to support a scale of operations which would make sense for Grofers. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, Grofers only captures the incremental demand for grocery delivery, and with most small retailers already offering grocery delivery, the value Grofers adds is to deliver from large retailers. While I don’t have data to support this, my hypothesis is that large retailers have a smaller share in small cities thus cutting Grofers’s natural market.

Next, the transaction cost of travelling to the store is lesser in smaller cities, given shorter travel times (on account of both size and traffic), further cutting demand for on-demand delivery. Thirdly, while smartphones are widespread across the country, my hypothesis (again don’t have data to support this) is that usage is lower in smaller cities (compared to larger cities). Fourthly, smaller cities are likely to be less dense than larger cities (data on this should be available but NED to compile it now) meaning delivery personnel have to cover larger areas.

Some thinking can lead to more such reasons, but the basic point is that not only are these cities small, but demand for on-demand hyperlocal grocery delivery is also much lower (on a per capita basis) than in larger cities for several reasons.

These two factors have together meant that the scale (and density) of demand that is necessary for Grofers to be viable as a business was simply not there in these cities. So it’s a logical move for them to pull out.

This doesn’t answer, however, the question of why Grofers entered these cities in the first place, since the above factors should’ve been apparent before the entry. My hypothesis here is that some fast-growing startups measure their growth in terms of the number of cities they’re in. I’ll elaborate on that on another day.

The service marketplace paradox

This came out of a conversation a few weeks back, and resurfaced in a conversation yesterday. There is a fundamental paradox in service marketplaces – the more useless the general quality of service is, the more useful the marketplace. Let me explain.

Let us take the market for plumbers, for example. There are several hyperlocal service marketplaces in India (like HouseJoy or LocalOye) which supply plumbers on demand. Their biggest challenge is offline transactions (as this article about US-based HomeJoy describes) – once two sides of the market are introduced to each other, they take further transactions online.

Thus, there is a huge amount of activity and value taken offline once the introduction has been made, as the long tail of the client/pro relationship takes hold. Clients are perpetually motivated to move their pro relationships off platform, because it’s one less intermediary to go through to directly access the pros they love.

In other words, once I’ve discovered a plumber through HouseJoy (for example), and find his work to be good, the next time I need a plumber I’ll simply call him rather than call HouseJoy (cutting out the middleman). If the plumber is reliable and produces reasonable service, HouseJoy has practically lost me as a customer for plumbing services for a long time.

On the other hand, if the plumber I used the first time is good but not reliable (doesn’t arrive on time the next time I call him), I’m likely to use HouseJoy (or a competitor)  the next time round. In other words, the worse the service providers are (in terms of reliability, not quality of work), the greater the likelihood of the platform getting business!

This is the fundamental paradox of service marketplaces. When services are reliable, you don’t need a marketplace. So if you need a marketplace only if services are unreliable, the server side of the marketplace is full of unreliable people. The hope, and the value that the marketplace adds, is that by aggregating a bunch of unreliable people, some level of reliability is guaranteed. The question is how sustainable this is.

Think of this another way – the level of reliability offered by a marketplace can be described as the sum of reliability of service providers and reliability of the marketplace itself. So for a given level of overall reliability, the marketplace adds more value if individual service providers are less reliable!

Extending this model to other marketplaces and services is left as an exercise to the reader. Feel free to use the comments section to write your analysis.