On dumping tomatoes, burning wheat and leaving stands unsold

About a month back, I’d written that farmers in Karnataka, when faced with a glut in the tomato crop, elect to throw sack loads of tomatoes on the highways, rather than selling them. During the great depression in America, sack loads of wheat were burnt in order to prevent wheat prices from falling. During the India-Pakistan test match in Bangalore 2 months back, an entire stand (south east i think) was left completely unsold. All these have a common thread of logic – artificially restrict supply so that prices don’t crash, and you make more money.

Yes, I understand this is counterintuitive. How can you expect to make more by selling less rather than selling more? How can you expect to make more money by destroying what you’ve produced after investing thousands of rupees? Here is my take on the same. I’ll start with the necessary conditions for this kind of a situation, and then proceed to try and explain why this works.

1. Monopoly: A monopoly is essential for implementation of this kind of a situation. It is easy to understand why. Suppose there are multiple independent suppliers. Who is going to dump their stock? What is the incentive for you to dump your stock? You would rather that your neighbor dump his stock which is going to increase your profits. The only way out of this is in collusion. All producers get together and decide to dump stocks. Which effectively creates a cartel, and thus a monopoly.

2. Inelastic demand: For dumping to work, the additional revenue we make out of the un-dumped stocks should be more than the revenue we would’ve made from the dumped stock if we hadn’t dumped it. So basically the demand needs to be inelastic – around the region where we are going to dump. What i’m saying is that for a small change in quantity supplied, the price should increase by a large amount. As long as this keeps happening we can dump.

Going back to textbook monopoly economics, what we do to price is to maximize quantity * price. In other words, we supply the quantity where the total revenues are maximized. And it usually happens that this particular level is below the total amount we have produced. So we introduce into the market only as much produce that will maximize our revenues.

But what about the effort that has gone into production of this excess? Just look at the examples that I’ve mentioned. In all of them, you have already spent whatever amount that you had to spend. The costs have already been sunk. Apart from a couple of minor expenses (transportation, facilities, etc.) all expenses have been incurred before we made this decision. In other words Revenues are almost equal to profits. So we maximize revenues, not profits.

Now, taking the case of tomatoes, what do we do with the stock that we don’t want to sell? One option is to store it. That again, we’ll need to do based on how much the stored tomatoes will fetch us in the future, costs of storage et al. Given the facilities in India, it usually turns out that the costs of storage would be much higher than the expected revenues from it. So we only lose money by doing so. So what do we do? Dump them on the highways. Or if they take my suggestion, organize a Tomatina.

The other thing with tomatoes is that farmers don’t cooperate when they are making the decision regarding what to plant. If they did back then, some land that would’ve otherwise been used to sow tomatoes would be diverted to some other crop, which on the margin would yield more. Interestingly, the farmers seem to come together in a cartel only after the tomatoes have been produced!

So what are the policy implications from this? Firstly, infrastructure has to be improved. We need to be able to make storage of tomatoes cheaper, so as to encourage storage rather than throwing away. We need to encourage building of cold storages, and refrigerated transport systems. We need more investments in warehouses. Intuitively, it may appear as if these warehouses are just going to add to the cost of production, and thus push up inflation. If you see the larger picture, they are effectively encouraging efficient usage of land – which in my opinion is the most precious resource.

Second, the farmer needs to be able to easily estimate the revenues he will get by storing his goods. More importantly, he should be able to have a good idea about the revenues he will get from each crop even before he sows. And should be able to lock in the revenues before sowing.

We need to extend futures markets into all agricultural commodities. And keep the lot size reasonable so that it is accessible to small farmers. It is not as if the farmers won’t be able to use technology. Make it accessible to them, and they’ll easily take to it. The cell phone revolution is proof of that. Yes, small lot size could be a problem when it comes to settlement. Cash settled futures need to be explored.

Throwing tomatoes on the highway may be economically efficient when looked at in isolation. Looking at the larger picture, it only points to certain amounts of land and water and other inputs that have been wasted. That have been wasted growing tomatoes which no one needs, when they could’ve been used to grow something else. Agricultural commodity prices have been going up all over the world. Agricultural land and water are precious inputs, and need to be utilized judiciously if we have to continue feeding everyone. Futures markets help us allocating these resources efficiently.

Cross posted at the Indian Economy Blog

Coffee pricing at Chalukya

The pricing of coffee at the Samrat restaurant (part of Hotel Chalukya on Race Course Road) is interesting. This is a popular old restaurant, and being in an area full of government offices, is perennially crowded (despite its large size). It is a sit-down kind of restaurant, though you might have to share a table with strangers if you’ve gone in a group of less than four.

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Water privatization in Kundapur

A couple of years back, in a blog post (part of which also went into a project report), I’d talked about water privatization. I had said that it is a good thing even if it pushes up costs, because it now offers people the option to get piped water supply. The analysis went something like:

1. People who don’t currently have connections will now get connected. And once they are on the network, they have an option to get clean piped water.
2. For people who already have connections, their monthly costs will shoot up. Maybe double. However, given that the average water bill amount is quite low, and is an extremely small proportion of monthly expenditure. So small that even a 100% increase won’t have much of an impact.

It’s time to revisit that case, given that Kundapur, a coastal town in Karnataka has decided to privatize it’s water supply. To summarize, so far, this town was dependent on ground water. Now, they are getting water from the river Varahi. Residents have to pay Rs. 4000 for the connection (half of that refundable), and the monthly bill will come within Rs. 100, they’ve said.

There are two points to note here. Firstly, this is the first time that Kundapur is getting piped water supply. The second is that there is a huge up-front cost.

When I had talked about privatization giving the option of water supply to everyone, I had said that the costs should be structured such that the fixed charge is low or non-existent, and only usage is charged. This way, I had said, there won’t be any adverse impact on the poor (who are outside the system in the first place).

In this context, a financial restructuring of the Kundapur plan might be necessary. The TMC and the water supply firm will have to work out a scheme where they heavily subsidize the up front fee (to say about Rs. 500) in exchange for a higher per-unit charge for water. That kind of a structure would have several benefits.

Firstly, it would be far more inclusive and more people would be brought into the safe water plan. More people would be able to buy the option to get safe drinking water. Secondly, a higher variable charge will also result in more judicious consumption, which is critical for a limited resource such as fresh water. Thirdly, due to the changed payment structure, the heavy users of water (more likely to be the rich and upper middle classes) will end up cross-subsidizing the low volume users (usually the poor). Thus, the adverse impact on the poor can be brought down, and the people who wil have to pay more would be those who won’t mind paying a bit extra.

Of course, there is still a long way to go. The private partner who will handle the operation and maintenance is yet to be selected. There are also bound to be a large number of protests against the privatization itself. The TMC needs to get past that. Also, it seems to be the first time when such an exercise is being conducted in the country. So, other hurdles also can’t be ruled out.

Nevertheless, this outsourcing of operation and maintenance of water supply is a welcome concept, and if implemented and priced in the right way, might become a model to emulate in the rest of the country.

Cross posted at the Indian Economy Blog

Sugarcane Markets

Ah, no. Don’t get psyched by the title. This is not about agriculture, and will not be cross-posted on the Indian Economy Blog. This is more to do with the festival today. Sankranthi.

The basic activity during the festival is that you visit some N houses and give them a stick of sugarcane each (along with “side dishes” such as bananas, occasionally oranges, ellu (til i think it’s called; mixed with small cut pieces of coconut, jaggery, groundnuts, etc.) and figures made out of sugar). And you get back a stick of sugarcane in return (along with similar accompaniments).

Anyways, the point I’m trying to make is that there is very little chance that the sugarcane you buy will end up in your house. Unless of course you buy some “extra stuff” for yourself. And the market encourages recycling. Each piece of sugarcane usually changes hands at least four-five times. Thus, there is a very good chance that you don’t know at all the person who originally purchased the piece of sugarcane you are going to eat.

Another result of the high churn is that it’s difficult for people to keep track of the sugarcane pieces (they don’t have DHL stickers, do they?). There’s no way anyone can remember who gave them the sugarcane that they are now eating. And so there isn’t much of a reputational risk also, in giving poor sugarcane. The only thing is the size of the sugarcane stick. Since the “quality” on that measure can be measured easily. in one glance, as long as you don’t give too short a stick (you’ll definitely be classified as cheap then), you’re ok.

Ok, so, given that the nature of the market is such, what is the incentive to buy good quality sugarcane? What is the incentive to pay more to get better sugarcane? After all after you’ve given someone a piece of sugarcane it’s unlikely she checks for the quality of what you’ve given and then picks the stick to return to you based on that. So why should you even bother about buying good sugarcane?

The other day I’d been to the market, and most of the sugarcane on display seemed to be mediocre. And now, thinking about it, I’m not surprised. Unless you are highly ethical (and the proportion of such people is small, and falling) you’ll just buy whatever you can get cheapest. Simple. And the demand for good sugarcane is so low that the market itself doesn’t exist there, and so everyone is forced to buy mediocre sugarcane. Doesn’t this remind you in some way of the Tragedy of the Commons?

Our festivals should be better designed, I say!

Coffee segmentation and take away and food courts

I really like the way the coffee market in India is segmented. You have a clear distinction of cafe and coffee shop. If you just want a quick tasty caffeine kick, you just go to one of the cafes (Darshini types) and for some 6-7 rupees you’ll get excellent steaming and strong filter coffee. However, there is only standing room there and you can’t really hang around.

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Teaching Economics: Part Two

Madman Aadisht has extended my earlier post to talk about why Economics toppers from DU don’t necessarily need to clear in their concepts. He talks about the admission process and the internal examination process and the course content to arrive at this particular conclusion. So what could be done to fix it? There is no dearth of enthu for the study of economics in India. And I get the feeling that a lot of people are put off from it due to absence of quality colleges (apart from a couple of colleges in Delhi, and one in Bombay, nothing really stands out).

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The Sugarcane Mess

The situation with the sugar industry has gotten more bizarre, with the Allahabad HC stepping in and mandating that the mills buy sugarcane at Rs. 110 per kilo and start processing. While on first thought, it seems quite funny that the high court is getting into matters it shouldn’t get into, such as fixing of a market price, the situation on the ground is quite grim.

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Wheat Procurement And Derivatives Markets

So the government has done it again. After managing to procure only about 11 million tons out of the targeted 15 million tons from our farmers, the government has gone ahead and imported about half a million tons from the international market at a much higher price. A process which, in its entirety, ends up raising a large number of questions.

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The Barista Way

The Barista outlet outside Barton centre on M G Road seems to have come up with an excellent way in order to improve their “table turnovers”. They simply play loud and jarring music in order to make the stay as unpleasant as possible for the customers. And new ones keep pouring in so they are able to rake in a larger base on which to spread their enormous fixed costs (rent)!

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