Startup salary survey

I think I’ve come up with what I think is a really cool metric to value the tradeoff between your salary at a startup and the equity stake that you are given. For lack of a better name, I call this “multiple of foregone income”:

Let’s say that your “market salary” is $ 100,000 (pulling this number out of thin air), and since you are joining an early stage company which 1. cannot afford your market salary and 2. wants you to have some skin in the game, let’s say that you agree for $80,000. Now, your “foregone income” is $80,000 per year since that is the cut you are taking from what you think is your “market income”.

Let’s say the company is worth 10 million dollars (as per the latest round of funding before you join, assuming there has been one) and they give you a 1% stake (which amounts to $100,000), then the “multiple of foregone income” is 5 years ($100,000/$20,000 per year). If the company gives you equity that is worth $200,000, then your “multiple of foregone income” is 10 years.

Now I’m trying to figure out what the “normal” range of this multiple is. For this purpose I’ve created this form that I request you to fill out. I’m not asking for any personal details, the survey is completely anonymous and it will only take a minute of your time.

Thanks in advance! In return for your participation in the survey, I’ll publish aggregated results on the measure!

The finiteness of the global advertising market

In this excellent post on social media companies, Aswath Damodaran articulates something I’ve long wondered – about the finiteness of the global advertising market. Given the number of companies that come up with new mechanisms to match advertisers with consumers, one can be forgiven for believing that the market for advertising is infinite. That the more avenues you create for serving advertisements to people, the more the advertising that will flow, and there won’t be a let up anywhere.

This picture here is from Damodaran’s blog (which I recommend you subscribe to, since every single post is worth reading). Based on the numbers that Damodaran presents here, the overall growth of the worldwide advertising market seems rather low.

Source: Aswath Damodaran (http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.in/2014/11/twitters-bar-mitzvah-is-social-media.html). All numbers in billions of dollars

The number to take away for me from this calculation is the shrinking pie of non-digital advertising. Based on these numbers, the total non-digital advertising market in 2008 was $468 billion. In 2014, going by the same numbers this is down to $400 billion. This de-growth is significant and holds important lessons for other sectors that are dependent on advertising.

So far, the flow of advertising capital has been taken for granted and the number of business plans made (in both old and new economies) with an assumption on advertising growth is endless. If you want your local bus utility to make more money, you rent out advertising space on buses. If a low-cost airline wants to make more money, they put advertisements on the back of seats (a very good idea since it gets undivided attention for the duration of the flight). It is a surprise that insides of toilet stall doors (which again get undivided attention) haven’t fallen prey to advertisements yet.

The point here is that while it is all well and good to plan businesses based on advertising income, what we need to keep in mind is that the advertising pie in the long term grows at the same rate as the global economy. Sooner or later the waters will recede to the natural level, and then we will know who is swimming naked!

 

Valuing loan deals for football players

Initial reports yesterday regarding Radamel Falcao’s move to Manchester United mentioned a valuation of GBP 6 million for the one year loan, i.e. Manchester United had paid Falcao’s parent club AS Monaco GBP 6 million so that they could borrow Falcao for a year. This evidently didn’t make sense since earlier reports suggested that Falcao had been priced at GBP 55 million for an outright transfer, and has four years remaining on his Monaco contract.

In this morning’s reports, however, the value of the loan deal has been corrected to GBP 16 million, which makes more sense in light of his remaining period of contract, age and outright valuation.

So how do you value a loan deal for a player? To answer that, first of all, how do you value a player? The “value” of a player is essentially the amount of money that the player’s parent club is willing to accept in exchange for foregoing his use for the rest of his contract. Hence, for example, in Falcao’s case, GBP 55M  is the amount that Monaco was willing to accept for foregoing the remaining four years they have him on contract.

Based on this, you might guess that transfer fees are (among other things) a function of the number of years that a player has remaining on his contract with the club – ceteris paribus, the longer the period of contract, the greater is the transfer fee demanded (this is intuitive. You want more compensation for foregoing something for a longer time period than for a shorter time period).

From this point of view, let us now evaluate what it might take to take Falcao on loan for one year. Conceptually it is straightforward. Let us assume that the value Monaco expects to get from having Falcao on their books for a further four years is a small amount less than their asking price of GBP 55M – given they were willing to forego their full rights for that amount, their valuation can be any number below that; we’ll assume it was just below that. Now, all we need to do is to determine how much of this GBP 55M in value will be generated in the first year, how much in the second year and so on. Whatever is the value for the first year is the amount that Monaco will demand for a loan.

Now, loans can be of different kinds. Clubs sometimes lend out their young and promising players so that they can get first team football in a different club – something the parent club would not be able to provide. In such loans, clubs expect the players to come back as better players (Daniel Sturridge’s loan from Chelsea to Bolton is one such example) and thus with a higher valuation. Given this expectations, loan fees are usually zero (or even negative – where the parent club continues to bear part of the loanee’s wages).

Another kind of loan is for a player who is on the books but not particularly wanted for the season. It could happen that player’s wages are more than what the club hopes to get in terms of his contribution on the field (implying a negative valuation for the player). In such cases, it is possible for clubs to loan out the player while still covering part of the player’s salary. In that sense, the loan fee paid by the target club is actually negative (since they are in a sense being paid by the parent club to loan the player out). An example of this kind was Andy Carroll’s loan from Liverpool to West Ham United in the 2012-13 season.

Falcao is currently in the prime of his career (aged 29) and heavily injury prone. Given his age and injury record, he is likely to be a fast depreciating asset. By the time he runs out his contract at Monaco (when he will be 33), he is likely to be not worth anything at all. This means that a lion’s share of the value Monaco can derive out of him would be what they would derive in the next one year. This is the primary reason that Monaco have demanded 30% of the four year fee for one year of loan.

Loaning a player also involves some option valuation – based on his performance on loan his valuation at the end of the loan period can either increase or decrease. At the time of loaning out this is a random variable and we can only work on expectations. The thing with Falcao is that given the stage of his career the probability of him being much improved after a year is small. On the other hand, his brittleness means the probability of him being a lesser player is much larger. This ends up depressing the expected valuation at the end of the loan period and thus pushes up the loan fee. Thinking about it, this should have pushed up Falcao’s loan fee above GBP 16M but another factor – that he has just returned from injury and may not be at peak impact for a couple of months has depressed his wages.

Speaking of option valuation, it is possibly the primary reason why young loan signings to lesser clubs come cheap – the possibility of regular first team football increases significantly the expected valuation of the player at the end of the loan period, and this coupled with the fact that the player is not yet proven (which implies a low “base sale price”) drives the loan valuation close to zero.

Loaning is thus a fairly complex process, but players’ valuations can be done in rather economic terms – based on expected contribution in that time period and option valuation. Loaning can also get bizarre at times – Fernando Torres’s move to Milan, for example, has been classified by Chelsea as a “two year loan”, which is funny given that he has two years remaining on his Chelsea contract. It is likely that the deal has been classified as a loan for accounting purposes so that Chelsea do not write off the GBP 50M they paid for Torres’s rights in 2010 too soon.

Damodaran on Uber’s Valuation

It is fascinating to watch this backandforth between NYU Prof Aswath Damodaran and Uber board member Bill Gurley on the taxi company’s valuation.

To set the context, when the latest funding round for Uber was announced, valuing it at USD 17 billion, Damodaran – a guru in valuation – wrote his own analysis which valued the company at about a third of that value. While it was a typical Damodaran post – long, detailed and making and stating lots of assumptions – it was probably intended as an academic exercise (the way I see it).

Instead it seems to have really caught the fancy of the silicon valley investment community, and led to a response by Gurley (I admit I haven’t read his full response – it seemed to attack straw men in places). And Damodaran has responded to the response. Now that the Three Way Handshake is complete I don’t expect any more backs and forths, but I won’t rule it out either (it’s possible but not plausible, to use Damodaran’s terminology).

What fascinates me is why an academic’s academic post on valuation of a company has created so much of a flutter – so much to merit a long-winded response from the board member. I’m reminded of two things that my valuation professor had told me some 10 years back when I was in business school.

1. Valuation is always wrong
2. Value of a company is what the market thinks it’s valued at

The first of these is a bit of a motherhood statement and adds no value to this particular discussion so let’s not take that into account. It’s the second reason that has got the investors’ knickers in a twist.

In the past, I’ve seen Damodaran publish valuations of companies that are about to go public, or are already public – Tesla and Twitter for example. It is usually an academic exercise, and Damodaran’s valuations value these companies at lower than what the market values. However, given that these posts have appeared after there has been a broad consensus of a company’s valuation, it has not really impacted a company’s valuation, and thus have been treated as an academic exercise.

The problem with Uber is that it is a private company, and unlikely to go public for a very long time. The problem with a private company is that it is difficult for investors to agree on its valuation – there are very few trades and the stock is illiquid (by definition). And illiquidity means extremely high bid-ask spreads (to put a technical spin on it) and widely varying valuations.

Sometimes, when nobody knows what something is valued at (like Uber – which is creating a new category which no one has any experience in valuing), what people look for is some kind of a peg, or an “anchor”. When they see what they think is a reasonable and broadly reliable valuation, they tend to use that valuation as an “anchor” and if a large number of investors agree on one such anchor, the anchor ends up being the company’s valuation itself.

To reiterate, value of a company is what the market thinks it’s valued at. Nobody knows what Uber is valued at. Investors and existing shareholders agreed at a particular valuation, and did a deal at that valuation. However, this valuation is not “deep” – not too many people agree to this valuation.

It is in this context that an (very well renowned) academic’s valuation, which values the company at far less than the last transacted price, can act as an anchor. Damodaran is extremely widely respected in investing circles, and hence his valuation is likely to have received much attention. It might even be possible that his valuation becomes an “anchor” in investors’ minds of Uber’s valuation. And this is where the problem lies.

Even if you were to account for the consistent downward bias in Damodaran’s valuations and adjust Uber’s valuation accordingly, it is likely to lead  to a much lower anchor compared to the last transacted price. And this is not likely to be good for existing investors. Hence, they need to take steps to quickly debunk Damodaran’s valuation, to make sure it doesn’t end up as an anchor! And hence the long response by Gurley, and the silicon valley investor community in general!

To summarize, all that this entire brouhaha on Uber’s valuation shows is that its price discovery so far has been rather shallow.

Analyzing the IPL Auction Rules – 1

So finally after a really long delay the rules for the IPL Auction 2014 are out. Each franchise has the option of retaining up to five players, with additional “trump cards” that allow them to match the price of a winning bid in the auction for players that were part of their teams in the earlier IPLs.

At the outset, the rules of the auction look loaded towards teams that already have strong squads and want to retain as many players as they can – for example, given the rules of the auction, a team can retain up to 6 players from their existing squads, and this significantly biases the auction in favour of teams that want to retain players.

Looking a bit deeper, though, it is clear that this luxury of retention comes at a price. For example, irrespective of what the team negotiates with its number one player, Rs. 12.5 Crore (125 million), or a little more than 20% of the cumulative salary cap will be debited from the team’s account. For the next player, Rs. 9.5 Crore (95 million) will be debited. There is a sliding scale and the fifth player a team retains will cost them Rs. 4 Crore in terms of their budget.

The question is if this pricing is appropriate – is charging 20% of the team budget for the number one player enough compensation for the benefit the team gets by way of retention? Is charging two thirds of the total salary cap (Rs. 39 Crore) enough for retention of five players?

At first look, this pricing looks appropriate – after all, why would someone want to forego two thirds of their auction kitty for keeping just five players, when the total squad size is 16 to 27? However, looking at the previous auctions tells a different story.

The two graphs here shows the proportion of total auction money spent by each team on each player in the last two auctions. The graph might appear complicated so let me explain. For each team, I ordered players bought in the auction in the descending order of price. Then I looked at how much the top player cost as a proportion of the total money spent at the auction. Then, how much the top two players cost and so on.

ipl08

 

ipl11

 

 

 

 

 

(click on images for full size. For the 2008 auction, marquee players have been included in the analysis)

In the 2008 auction, teams spent between 60 and 85% of their budgets in order to select their five most expensive players, with a median of 72%. In the 2011 auction, teams spent between 65 and 90% of their budgets for their top five players (takes into account retained players), and the median spend was 71%. 

Given that the “top 5” players for each team cost them upwards of 70% of their total budgets in the last two auctions, charging teams only Rs. 39 Crore (65%) for retaining five players is blatantly unfair, and biased towards the teams that want to retain. Also, considering that retained players are “known devils”, there is more value for money for teams from retained players. So in the ideal case, the fee for retaining 5 players should have been definitely upwards of 75% of the total budget (Rs. 45 Crore).

The following table helps to show the undervaluation of each retained player:

costmatrix

 

The second and third columns in the above table shows the median percentage of total budget teams spent in order to buy their top N players. The last column shows what percentage of their budget they would have to spend if they are to retain players in the auction.

The message for teams is clear: retain as much as you can. It is cheaper to retain your top players rather than building a new team from the available pool. The challenge, however, is to negotiate a good price with these players.

PS: I have a solution that can help teams plan their auction strategy. If you are an IPL team and you are interested in this, contact me through the contact form.