Standard Error in Survey Statistics

Over the last week or more, one of the topics of discussion in the pink papers has been the employment statistics that were recently published by the NSSO. Mint, which first carried the story, has now started a whole series on it, titled “The Great Jobs Debate” where people from both sides of the fence have been using the paper to argue their case as to why the data makes or doesn’t make sense.

The story started when Mint Editor and Columnist Anil Padmanabhan (who, along with Aditya Sinha (now at DNA) and Aditi Phadnis (of Business Standard), ranks among my favourite political commentators in India) pointed out that the number of jobs created during the first UPA government (2004-09) was about 1 million, which is far less than the number of jobs created during the preceding NDA government (~ 60 million). And this has led to hue and cry from all sections. Arguments include leftists who say that jobless growth is because of too much reforms, rightists saying we aren’t creating jobs because we haven’t had enough reform, and some other people saying there’s something wrong in the data. Chief Statistician TCA Anant, in his column published in the paper, tried to use some obscurities in the sub-levels of the survey to point out why the data makes sense.

In today’s column, Niranjan Rajadhyaksha points out that the way employment is counted in India is very different from the way it is in developed countries. In the latter, employers give statistics of their payroll to the statistics collection agency periodically. However, due to the presence of the large unorganized sector, this is not possible in India so we resort to “surveys”, for which the NSSO is the primary organization.

In a survey, to estimate a quantity across a large sample, we simply take a much smaller sample, which is small enough for us to rigorously measure this quantity. Then, we try and extrapolate the results to the large sample. The key thing in survey is “standard error”, which is a measure of error that the “observed statistic” is different from the “true statistic”. What intrigues me is that there is absolutely no mention of the standard error in any of the communication about this NSSO survey (again I’m relying on the papers here, haven’t seen the primary data).

Typically, when we measure something by means of a survey, the “true value” is usually expressed in terms of the “95% confidence range”. What we say is “with 95% probability, the true value of XXXX lies between Xmin and Xmax”. An alternate way of representation is “we think the value of XXXX is centred at Xmid with a standard error of Xse”. So in order to communicate numbers computed from a survey, it is necessary to give out two numbers. So what is the NSSO doing by reporting just one number (most likely the mid)?

Samples used by NSSO are usually very small. At least, they are very small compared to the overall population, which makes the standard error to be very large. Could it be that the standard error is not reported because it’s so large that the mean doesn’t make sense? And if the standard error is so large, why should we even use this data as a basis to formulate policy?

So here’s my verdict: the “estimated mean” of the employment as of 2009 is not very different from the “estimated mean” of the employment as of 2004. However, given that the sample sizes are small, the standard error will be large. So it is very possible that the true mean of employment as of 2009 is actually much higher than the true mean of 2004 (by the same argument, it could be the other way round, which points at something more grave). So I conclude that given the data we have here (assuming standard errors aren’t available), we have insufficient data to conclude anything about the job creation during the UPA1 government, and its policy implications.

A new paradigm for selling advertising slots

There are fundamentally two kinds of videos – videos for which willing to pay to see, and videos which you are paid to see. It is intuitive that advertisements fall in the latter model – for watching an advertisement, you are being “paid” a certain sum of virtual money which gets encashed when you watch the program along with with the advertisement appears.

You might also notice that despite all the hue and cry about copyrights and people getting videos pulled off youtube, it is unlikely to find a case where an advertisement has been pulled off youtube. An advertiser will only be too happy to have more people watching the advertisement, and by pulling it off youtube, the advertisor will be shooting himself in the foot.

When you are watching TV, and a painful ad comes along, you are likely to switch channels. Or get up and take a break. And turn your eyeball to the screen only when all the advertisements for that particular session are over. So, in effect, by showing a bad advertisement, a channel is reducing the number of eyeballs for the other advertisement in the same session (a session is defined as a consecutive set of advertisements, uninterrupted by the main program. it can run from approximately thirty seconds to five minutes)

On the other hand, a good, popular and well-made advertisement is unlikely to make the viewer switch channels, or get up. It is more likely to generate higher eyeballs for the other advertisements in the session – without any additional effort by the other advertisements in the slot. And thus pushes up the value added for all advertisers in that particular slot.

So the idea is simple – advertising slot providers (i.e. TV channels, etc.) should incentivise advertisers to make better advertisements. Or use the better advertisements more. And the simplest incentive you can give is monetary. So offer a discount for the better and more popular ads. So far, the model has been to make viewers view ads that come along with a programme. The new paradigm is to make viewers view ads because they are placed next to ads that viewers want to see.

I’m sure that once this kind of pricing gets implemented, it will be more profitable both for the TV Channel and for the viewers. TV Channels will be able to sell the “network value” of placing ads on their medium, and use that to more than compensate for the lost revenue in terms of discount. Viewers will like it because the bad ads will be gone, and they will be saved the trouble of switching channels each time there is an ad break.

There remains the small matter of implementation. We need a way for rating advertisements. Online/SMS polling will be no good as they can be rigged. Neither will youtube help. We will need to find a better way to gauge how much people in general find ads. If there is some way in which TRPs for ads can be measured, that would be helpful, too. I’ll think about this problem, and maybe publish a solution to it in due course. I urge you also to think about this kind model, and let me know if you can come up with any bright ideas.

One option would be for the channel to pick what it calls a “winner advertisement” and fix the various slots in which it is going to be played. Maybe the winner might be given the choice of picking which slots it wants to go in. Then, the channel can make the placement of these winner ads public to the other advertisers and encourage them to bid for the surrounding slots. This bidding can help gauge the popularity of the initial winner ad, and then the channel should share some part of the proceeds of the auction with the winner advertiser. And when the premium that other advertisers are willing to pay in order to get a slot close to the winner drops, the channel will know that it is not a winner anymore and replace it.

So what I have described here is some sort of effective peer-review process for advertisements. Different channels can choose different strategies for the order in which to let channels pick their slots, about what kind of auctions to hold, etc. The most important thing about this peer-review process is that here people are voting with their chequebooks – and when people do that, they are very likely to know what they are doing.

So think about this. I think it is a good idea, and it seems like one of those things that if one channel implements it, it will become some sort of an industry-wide standard. And if you are not doing this because you think you don’t have quantitatively inclines people,  the fired investment bankers are still around.